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 The vast amount of assets owned by institutional investors has significantly altered the 
ownership structure of organizations. The purpose of this study is to explore the share 
ownership by institutional investors among firms listed on Bursa Malaysia. The sample 
consists of 330 firms as listed in 2011, and the share ownership of institutional 
investors is measured by the percentage of ownership held by the institutional investors 
in the annual report. The results reveal that more than two-third of the firms under study 
has share ownership by institutional investors. The largest share ownership is by the 
unit trusts and mutual funds institutions. Furthermore, by separate institutions, the 
government-managed unit trust fund, namely the Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB) 
and the ‘Pilgrims Fund’ or the Lembaga Tabung Haji (LTH) hold the highest 
percentage of share ownership, followed by the government-managed pension fund, 
namely the Employees Provident Fund (EPF). When institutions are classified 
according to their investment behavior, dedicated institutions mark a higher level of 
ownership compared to transient institutions. Moreover, government-managed 
institutions significantly dominate the market for institutional shareholdings.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The rapid emergence of a highly competitive global marketplace indicates the existence of a group of 
stakeholders, referred to as institutional investors. These may be defined as large investors, other than natural 
persons, who exercise discretion over the investment of others (Lang & McNichols, 1997). Contrary to natural 
persons, institutional investors act as a unified entity, and can be categorized according to the type of 
organization, for instance, the pension funds, mutual funds, investment bankers and insurance companies 
(Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991).  Institutional investors are responsible in managing the funds collected on 
behalf of their beneficiaries through an investment mandate (Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group & 
Securities Commission Malaysia, 2014).   
 Supported by the fact that large funds tend to be secured by this type of investor, a significant ownership 
structure of institutional investors has been evidenced both in developed and developing markets. For instance, 
almost 60% of shareholdings in the United States and Canadian listed firms belonged to institutional investors, 
while 37.9% of shareholdings were thus observed in the United Kingdom, (Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, & Matos, 
2011). In Malaysia, representing developing countries, it was observed that institutional investors held 51% of 
shares in the 10 largest companies listed on Bursa Malaysia (Saleh, Zulkifli, & Muhamad, 2010). Furthermore, 
70% of total institutional shareholdings belong to the five largest government-controlled institutional investors, 
namely the Employees Provident Fund (EPF), Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera (LTAT) or Armed Forces 
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Fund Board, Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB), Lembaga Tabung Haji (LTH), and National Social Security 
Organization of Malaysia (SOCSO) (Abdul Wahab, How, & Verhoeven, 2008). 
 This relatively large ownership by institutional investors is due to the vast amount of assets they control. In 
the developing nations of East Asia, assets of institutional investors amounted to USD 1.5 trillion, or around 
45% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the region as a whole (Ghosh, 2006). In Malaysia, three largest types 
of institutional investors, namely pension funds, life insurance, and mutual funds held total assets of USD 114 
billion equivalent to 96.4% of Malaysian GDP (Ghosh, 2006). More recent statistics indicate that at the end of 
2013, the EPF, Malaysia’s largest pension fund, holds approximately USD 182 billion (Towers Watson, 2014), 
thus justifying the infinite amount of assets which may allow them to have the ability in shaping the ownership 
structure of organizations.   
 This study intends to further explore the share ownership owned by institutional investors in Bursa 
Malaysia listed firms. Although a number of studies have been conducted on the institutional investors in 
Malaysian market, limited evidence has been found regarding detailed examinations of the various types of 
institutional investors among Bursa Malaysia listed firms. Previous research concentrated on institutional 
investors in largest firms (Saleh et al., 2010), or focused on the largest institutional investors (Abdul Wahab et 
al., 2008; Abdul Wahab, Mat Zain, James, & Haron, 2009), and utilized small sample size (Pirzada, Mustapha, 
& Wickramasinghe, 2015). Furthermore, some previous studies have been based on old data (Ghosh, 2006; 
Katan & Mat Nor, 2015). Therefore, inspired by the gap in previous literature, this study intends 1) to examine 
the presence of institutional investor shareholdings; and (2) to identify the level of shareholdings by different 
types of institutional investors, in Bursa Malaysia listed firms. The contributions of this study are as follows: the 
institutional shareholdings are comprehensively examined according to type of institutional investors and their 
investment behavior, as well as ownership status (government, private or, foreign owned), through the use of 
recent data and widespread sampling.  
 The rest of the paper progresses as follows. The next section reviews related literature on institutional 
investors in Malaysia. This is followed by a consideration of the methodology and findings. The concluding 
remarks summarize the main results, highlight the study limitations and suggest avenues for future research. 
 
Literature Review: 
 Institutional investors in an ownership structure have been shown to be linked to several benefits. Firstly, 
institutional investors are seen to be in a unique position to exercise influence over firms in which they invest. 
Institutional investors may hold firms accountable for good governance (Securities Commission Malaysia, 
2011a), as such institutions will have good access to information and resources to build necessary monitoring 
capabilities (Abdul Jalil & Abdul Rahman, 2010; Chung, Firth, & Kim, 2002). Secondly, the presence of 
institutional investors in an ownership structure may also help mitigate aggressive earnings management (Abdul 
Jalil & Abdul Rahman, 2010; Chung et al., 2002; Hsu & Koh, 2005; Koh, 2003), especially when the 
institutions have large or substantial shareholdings. They may inhibit firm managers from performing earnings 
management, such as increasing or decreasing reported profits according to the managers’ desire (Chung et al., 
2002). Apart from that, earnings management has also been found to be mitigated by the existence of long-term 
or dedicated institutions, which signals that this type of institutions may act as a good corporate governance 
mechanism to mitigate earnings management (Hsu & Koh, 2005; Koh, 2003). Thirdly, firms with more 
institutional shareholdings are also seen to be more inclined to engage in social and environmental 
responsibilities (Abd-Mutalib, Muhammad Jamil, & Wan-Hussin, 2013; Johnson & Greening, 1999; Oh & 
Chang, 2011).  
 The market for institutional investors in Malaysia is strongly controlled by the Malaysian government 
(Abdul Wahab et al., 2008), which is mainly dominated by the federal government’s investment institutions, 
known as the Government Linked Investment Companies (GLICs). The GLICs comprise three major pension 
funds, namely the EPF, the Retirement Fund Incorporate or Kumpulan Wang Amanah Pencen (KWAP) and 
LTAT; a unit trust fund, namely the PNB, a pilgrims fund, known as the LTH, a sovereign wealth fund, namely 
the Khazanah Nasional (Khazanah) and an investment arm, which is the Menteri Kewangan Diperbadankan 
(MKD) or Ministry of Finance Incorporated, MOF (Inc) (Putrajaya Committee on GLC High Performance, 
2014). Besides these GLICs, other institutions exist such as state government institutions, banks, insurance 
companies, and cooperatives.  
 The market for institutional investors is highly controlled by the government due in part to the introduction 
of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1970, in which the government utilized institutional investors as tools to 
reduce the equity gap between various ethnic groups in the country by increasing the equity ownership of 
Bumiputera in the capital market (Jomo, 2004). One of the major goals of the NEP is to achieve 30% holdings 
of share capital for the Bumiputera. Therefore, trust agencies were established to accumulate shares on behalf of 
the Bumiputera community, with the purpose of redistributing them at some future date (Beeson, 2000).  
 The establishment of the trust agencies consequently has led to the foundation of other institutions by the 
governments with their own purposes, which are in line with the government’s objectives. These government-
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related institutions or GLICs play an important role in the share ownership of Malaysian firms, as five of the 
major GLICs held 70% of institutional shareholdings in firms listed on Bursa Malaysia (Abdul Wahab et al., 
2008). Besides the GLICs, the market for institutional investors in Malaysia also comprises other types of 
federal and state government institutions, as well as private institutions such as banks, insurance companies and 
unit trust and mutual funds asset management companies. The following sub-sections describe the types of 
institutional investors in the Malaysian market. 
 
Pension and Provident Funds: 
 By general definition, pension and provident funds collect, pool, and invest funds contributed by sponsors 
and beneficiaries, to provide for retirement income of beneficiaries (Davis, 2002). Although the purpose of both 
funds is the same, which is to provide retirement income for the depositors, the main difference between the two 
is based on how the income is paid. Pension funds enable depositors to receive a portion of the income at 
retirement, while the remainder is paid throughout the retirement age. Similarly, provident funds enable the 
beneficiaries to receive a lump sum upon retirement.     
 In Malaysia, the major pension and provident funds are government-controlled institutions, such as the EPF 
or Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja (KWSP), KWAP, and LTAT. EPF was established in 1951, to serve as 
the provident fund for private and non-pensionable public sector employees. KWAP, previously known as the 
Pensions Trust Fund, was established in 1991 and acts as the pension fund for pensionable public sector 
employees.  LTAT, established in 1972, serves as the retirement fund and other benefits for the armed forces. 
These pension and provident funds hold vast assets. In 2004, the assets of these funds were estimated at USD 70 
billion. Of this amount, USD 63.3 billion belonged to the EPF, which makes the provident fund the largest 
institutional investor in Malaysia (Ghosh, 2006). More current statistics by Towers Watson, a professional 
services company, show that EPF is seventh among the 300 world largest pension funds, with the total assets of 
USD 182 billion in 2013 (Towers Watson, 2014).  
 Besides these government-managed funds, there are also foreign pension funds and private pension funds, 
which are usually owned by local firms such as Tenaga Nasional Berhad Retirement Benefit Trust or Public 
Bank Officers’ Retirement Benefit Fund (Abd-Mutalib et al., 2013). 
  
Unit Trust and Mutual Funds: 
 Unit trust or mutual funds are defined as the investment tools or vehicles created by asset management 
companies specializing in pooling savings from both retail and institutional investors (Abdullah, Hassan, & 
Mohamad, 2007), with the aim of helping investors to grow their wealth by diversifying their investment 
portfolios. In Malaysia, the term ‘unit trust’ is more popular, although some unit trust management companies 
(UTMCs) use the term ‘mutual funds’ as well.  
 Unit trust and mutual funds have experienced considerable growth over the last decade in terms of the 
number of funds offered, and the volume of capital managed by the UTMCs. In 2004, Malaysian unit trust and 
mutual fund assets were estimated at USD 23 billion, equivalent to 19.4% of GDP (Ghosh, 2006). Furthermore, 
statistics by the Securities Commission Malaysia revealed that in 2006, there were 387 launched funds, with a 
total net asset value (NAV) of RM112 billion (Securities Commission Malaysia, 2006), and the figures have 
increased to 587 launched funds with a total NAV of RM 222 billion at the end of 2011 (Securities Commission 
Malaysia, 2011b).  
 In Malaysia, the situation of unit trust and mutual funds is unique, as they are divided into government-
managed and private-managed funds. The government-managed funds are those funds under the management of 
Amanah Saham Nasional Berhad (ASNB), which is wholly owned by the PNB, one of the GLICs. PNB was 
incorporated in 1978 to act as a pivotal instrument of the federal government’s NEP, the objective being to 
promote share ownership in the corporate sectors among the Bumiputera. Besides federal government influence 
through ASNB and PNB, unit trusts in Malaysia are also managed by state government agencies, such as 
Amanah Saham Kedah Berhad and Amanah Saham Sarawak Berhad. For the private-managed funds, some 
UTMCs are under the corporate control of local and foreign banks and investment companies.      
 
Pilgrims Fund: 
 Another major institution in the Malaysian market for institutional investors is the pilgrims fund, which is 
popularly known as LTH. LTH began operation in September 1963 with the aim of providing a mean of savings 
for the Muslims who wish to embark on a pilgrimage journey. Prior to the establishment of LTH, Muslims, 
especially in the rural areas, had to sell their livestock and properties in order to gain cash to pay for pilgrimage 
expenses. However, this medium poses a dangerous situation to the economic structure and could retard 
economic growth. Therefore in 1969, based on a working paper to improve the economy for future pilgrims by 
Royal Professor Ungku Aziz, the Malaysian government decided to form the Future Pilgrim Fund Corporation. 
The establishment of the institution which is currently known as LTH, is consistent with the objective of 
managing the funds of the future Malaysian Muslim pilgrims without being based on riba’ (usury) system and 
179                                                                             Hafizah Abd-Mutalib et al, 2016 
Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences, 10(11) Special 2016, Pages: 176-184 
 
through investments compliant with Shariah, and which provide benefits to the depositors (Mohd Nor, 
Abdullah, Ali, & Zakaria, 2012).    
 The LTH was established under Act 8 of the Pilgrimage Fund and Management Board Act 1969. Besides 
providing the means to save for future pilgrims, LTH also strives to provide excellent hajj management services 
and strengthen the depositors’ economy by investing in strategic investments locally and globally to ensure 
sustainable and continuous growth.  Although LTH acts as a finance company that invests the savings of would-
be pilgrims in accordance with Shariah, its role is rather limited, as it was established as a non-bank financial 
institution.  
 
Banks: 
 The market for institutional investors in Bursa Malaysia listed firms also comprises banks, which may be 
categorized as either domestic or foreign banks. The banking sector’s market is dominated by the domestic 
banks, where in 2001, 75% of the market share belonged to the domestic banks in terms of total assets and total 
deposits (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2001). Despite the dominance by the domestic banks, the presence of foreign 
banks is relatively significant. The operation of foreign banks in Malaysia started with the establishment of the 
Standard Chartered Bank in 1875, and by the end of 1990, 146 branches of 16 foreign banks were operating 
throughout the country (Marashdeh, 1994). Since then, foreign banks have become key players contributing to 
the Malaysian economy, with 27% holdings of the market share of the assets of the banking sector in 2012 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 2012).  
 In terms of operations, the banking system in Malaysia is divided into several categories, namely 
commercial banks, finance companies, merchant banks, discount houses and money brokers, all of which are 
licensed under the Banking and Financial Institutions Act (BAFIA) 1989 and supervised by Bank Negara 
Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2001). These banks deal with the traditional functions of banks, including 
retail-banking services, cross-border payment services, hire purchase financing, leasing, short-term credit, trade 
financing and many more (Sufian, 2006). The banking operating system is also divided between conventional 
and Islamic system, where the latter operates within the boundaries of Shariah law. What is unique in the 
Malaysian banking system is that conventional banks are allowed to offer Islamic banking and finance products 
along with the conventional products (Sufian, 2007). 
 
Insurance Companies: 
 The insurance sector in Malaysia is different from other countries based on the fact that it functions under a 
dual operating system, consisting of conventional and takaful (Islamic insurance) operating systems. Although 
the takaful system is considered new compared to the established conventional insurance system, the efficiency 
of takaful system is considered competitive or at par with to the conventional system (Md Saad, Abd Majid, 
Mohd Yusof, Duasa, & Abdul Rahman, 2006). This situation denotes that both the takaful and conventional 
insurance systems can provide efficient services to their customers. Therefore, Muslim customers have an 
alternative way of getting proper security which does not violate the Shariah laws (Islamic Law).       
 The insurance sector in Malaysia has been progressing well. In 1990, the assets of insurance fund were 
estimated at only RM 9.5 billion, with RM 7 billion representing the assets for life insurance and the remaining 
general insurance (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2010). However, this figure has increased over the years; for 
instance, in the 2010 Malaysian Annual Insurance Statistics, the assets of insurance funds escalated from RM 
122 billion in 2007 (RM 102 billion for life insurance and RM 20 billion for general insurance) to RM 166 
billion (RM 141 billion for life insurance and RM 25 billion for general insurance) in 2010 (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 2010). This scenario shows the increasing trend of assets held by insurance companies.  
 In Malaysia, many insurance companies are under the corporate control of banks, operating in separate 
divisions. For instance, Etiqa Insurance and Takaful operate under the corporate control of Malayan Banking 
Berhad, while CIMB Bank Berhad has its own investment arm through CIMB Aviva Assurance, CIMB Aviva 
Takaful and BIMB Holdings Berhad with Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Berhad as its subsidiary. 
 
Other Government-Linked Investment Companies (GLICs): 
 Besides the above GLICs explained in previous sub-sections, two government-controlled institutions, 
namely a sovereign wealth fund, Khazanah Nasional, and the federal government’s investment arm, Menteri 
Kewangan Diperbadankan (MKD) or Ministry of Finance (Incorporated), MOF (Inc.) also contributes to the 
market for institutional investors in Bursa Malaysia listed firms. Details of both institutions are discussed in 
subsequent sub-sections.      
 
(i) Sovereign Wealth Funds: 
 SWF is a term used to describe a separate pool of government-owned or government-controlled financial 
assets that include some international assets, which may take many forms and are designed to achieve a variety 
of economic and financial objectives (Truman, 2008). SWFs may be classified into several categories, including 
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stabilizing funds, savings funds, pension reserve funds and investment corporations (Kunzel, Lu, Petrova, & 
Pihlman, 2010).  
 Stabilizing funds refer to the funds that are designed to reduce volatility by accumulating funds in good 
years, which may be subsequently used in bad years (Andersen & Faris, 2002). These funds are usually set up 
by countries rich in natural resources to insulate the budget and economy from volatile commodity prices 
(International Monetary Fund, 2007). The second category for SWF, the savings fund, is for the share of wealth 
for future generations (International Monetary Fund, 2007). For instance, countries rich in natural resources may 
set up savings funds by transferring the non-renewable assets into a diversified portfolio of international 
financial assets to provide for future generations or other long-term objectives (International Monetary Fund, 
2007). Another type of SWF is the pension reserve funds. The main feature that differentiates pension reserve 
funds and pension funds is that the ultimate beneficiaries do not have the legal or beneficial ownership of the 
funds as in pension funds; instead, the legal beneficiaries for the pension reserve funds are the institutions which 
administer the pension fund system. The objective of pension reserve funds is to cover identified liabilities often 
related to an aging population, which may lead to future economic vulnerability and expenditure. Therefore, the 
fund is a prudent measure to meet such challenges by accumulating assets in the current time to offset the 
projected liabilities in the future (Das, Lu, Mulder, & Sy, 2009). Lastly, investment corporations refer to SWF 
funds established as a separate entity with the objective of reducing the negative cost-of-carry of holding 
reserves or to pursue investment policies with higher returns (International Monetary Fund, 2007), and to 
enhance returns on reserves (Das et al., 2009). 
 Among the established SWFs of the world is the Malaysian incorporated SWF institution, Khazanah 
Nasional Berhad (KHAZANAH) (Kunzel et al., 2010), which was incorporated in September 1993 as a private 
limited company governed by the Companies Act, 1965. The equity of KHAZANAH is owned by the Ministry 
of Finance, which in essence makes KHAZANAH a wholly owned entity of the Malaysian Government. 
KHAZANAH operates as the government’s investment holding arm, with the objective of promoting economic 
growth and making strategic investment which may contribute to nation building. 
 
(ii) Minister of Finance (Incorporated):  
 The Ministry of Finance (Incorporated) or MOF (Inc.) was established as a corporate body under the 
Ministry of Finance (Incorporation) Act 1957, with the objective to oversee the investments made by the federal 
government of Malaysia. The act provides the authority to this institution to enter into contracts, acquisitions, 
purchases, possessions, holdings and maintain tangible and intangible assets on behalf of the federal 
government. MOF (Inc.) holds shares in various public and private firms in several sectors, namely the social, 
infrastructure and public facilities, technology, and economy sectors. 
 
Other Institutions: 
 Besides the major institutions as discussed in the above sections, the market for Malaysian listed firms’ 
institutional investors also comprise other institutions, such as the SOCSO, which was established in 1971 as an 
agency under the Ministry of Human Resources. The objective of its establishment is to enforce, administer, and 
implement the Social Employees’ Security Act 1969 and Social Employees’ General Safety Regulations 1971. 
SOCSO provides social security protection through social insurance, including medical and cash benefits, 
provision of artificial aids and rehabilitation to employees to reduce the sufferings and financial guarantees and 
protection for the family.  
 Other institutions are government-related institutions, whether the federal government, such as agencies 
belonging to the Government Ministries, the state government institutions, such as Majlis Agama Islam for 
respective states and development authorities, credit cooperatives, foundations and charities, whether domestic 
or foreign, which only hold an insignificant amount of shareholdings in the market for institutional investors 
among Malaysian listed firms. 
 
Methodology: 
 The population of study is the firms listed on Bursa Malaysia in the year 2011. Bursa Malaysia categorizes 
its listed firms into 11 categories, which are consumer products, industrial products, construction, trading and 
services, property, plantation, technology, infrastructure, finance, hotels, and real estate investment trust (REIT). 
Roscoe (1975), suggests that appropriate sample size should be between 30 and 500 samples. However, when 
samples are to be broken into different categories, the minimum of 30 per category is recommended. As such, 
by applying the rule of thumb of 30 samples per category, a total of 330 samples are selected for this study, and 
these categories are sampled using the stratified random sampling technique.  
 Institutional investors are defined according to their types as implied in previous research (Chaganti & 
Damanpour, 1991; Hsu & Koh, 2005; Koh, 2003), such as pension funds, unit trust and mutual funds, banks and 
insurance companies. The institutions are also segregated according to their investment behavior; dedicated 
institutions are those with long-term horizons in making investment decision, while transient institutions are 
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those with short-term investment horizon, as proposed by previous research (Abd-Mutalib, Muhammad Jamil, & 
Wan-Hussin, 2015; Cox, Brammer, & Millington, 2004; Cox & Wicks, 2011). The previous studies conclude 
that pension funds, government-managed unit trust funds and pilgrims funds to have dedicated behavior, while 
private-managed banks, private-managed mutual funds and insurance companies are with transient behavior. 
Furthermore, institutions are also separated according to their ownership status; whether they are government-
owned, private-managed or foreign-owned institutions. 
 All types of institutional investors are measured by the percentage of ordinary shares owned by each type of 
investor to the number of ordinary shares issued, which has been largely used in previous studies (Abd-Mutalib 
et al., 2015; Abdul Wahab et al., 2008; Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991; Cox et al., 2004). The institutional 
ownership data is captured from the “30 largest shareholders” section in the 2011 annual reports of the sampled 
firms. 
 
Findings: 
Presence of institutional investors’ shareholdings: 
 Table 1 presents the result of the existence of institutional shareholdings in Bursa Malaysia listed firms. The 
findings indicate that among the 330 samples under study, 229 firms or 69.4% of the firms have institutional 
shareholdings, while only 101 firms or 30.6% of the firms are without the holdings from institutional investors. 
 
Table 1: Percentage of Firms with Institutional Investors’ Shareholdings. 
 
Frequency Percentage 
Without Institutional Investors’ Ownership 101 30.6 
With Institutional Investors’ Shareholdings 229 69.4 
Total 330 100.0 
 
Percentage of shareholdings by different types of institutional investors: 
 Table 2 (Panel A-D), presents the results on the shareholdings by different types of institutional investors. 
In Panel A, the results reveal that in total, institutional shareholdings contribute to 13.22% of total shareholdings 
among Bursa Malaysia listed firms. Furthermore, the maximum count shows 92.94% institutional 
shareholdings, thus verify that there are firms which are being highly dominated by institutional investors. 
 
Table 2: Percentage of holdings by types of institutional investors. 
PANEL A 
Institutional Ownership Types Min Max Mean SD 
TOTAL 0.00 92.94 13.22 20.04 
PANEL B 
Pension Funds 0.00 43.03 1.97 4.77 
EPF 0.00 42.20 1.43 3.92 
KWAP 0.00 9.52 0.35 1.25 
LTAT 0.00 12.64 0.15 1.14 
Others (Private-managed) 0.00 4.73 0.04 0.35 
Unit Trust & Mutual Funds 0.00 57.31 3.42 7.09 
PNB 0.00 53.76 1.53 5.63 
Foreign 0.00 23.26 0.77 2.33 
Domestic 0.00 24.51 1.10 2.99 
Others (Govt-managed) 0.00 3.61 0.02 0.21 
Pilgrims Fund (LTH) 0.00 68.60 1.53 6.43 
Banks 0.00 32.03 1.72 3.71 
Foreign 0.00 32.03 1.40 3.26 
Domestic 0.00 17.45 0.32 1.93 
Insurance Companies 0.00 73.73 0.76 4.51 
Foreign 0.00 73.73 0.55 4.19 
Domestic 0.00 24.53 0.21 1.50 
Other Institutions 0.00 70.32 3.81 12.05 
Federal Government 0.00 62.49 1.37 6.75 
State Government 0.00 70.32 1.74 0.41 
Foreign Government 0.00 5.34 0.07 8.47 
Hedge Funds (Foreign) 0.00 3.52 0.02 0.24 
Coorperatives (Domestic) 0.00 56.42 0.27 3.18 
Foundation & Charities 
(Domestic) 0.00 49.77 0.34 3.61 
PANEL C 
Dedicated Institutions 0.00 75.50 5.05 11.00 
Transient Institutions 0.00 80.46 4.36 7.67 
Undetermined 0.00 70.32 3.81 12.05 
PANEL D 
Government-managed 0.00 89.14 8.11 16.23 
Private-managed 0.00 56.42 2.28 6.17 
Foreign Institutions 0.00 75.79 2.82 6.28 
Variables Definition: 
EPF = Employees Provident Fund; KWAP = Retirement Funds Incorporated; LTAT = Armed Forced Fund Board; PNB = Permodalan Nasional Berhad; LTH = Lembaga Tabung 
Haji. 
Dedicated institutions = Pension funds, government-managed unit trust funds (PNB) and government-managed pilgrims fund (LTH); Transient institutions = Banks, private-
managed mutual funds, and insurance companies. 
N = 330 
 
 When institutions are divided into five broad categories (excluding the institutional investors classified as 
“others”), namely pension funds, unit trust and mutual funds, pilgrims fund, banks, insurance companies and 
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others, it is found that the unit trust and mutual marks the highest percentage of shareholdings with the mean of 
3.42%, followed by the pension funds with 1.97% and banks with 1.72%. As separate entities, the PNB and the 
LTH mark the highest shareholdings at 1.53%, followed by the EPF with 1.43%. 
 Panel C states the results of institutional shareholdings according to their investment behavior. The results 
reveal that dedicated institutions hold a higher percentage of shareholdings with a mean of 5.05%, while 
transient institutions with the mean of 4.36%. Meanwhile, in Panel D, the government-managed institutions 
show a significant level of shareholdings with the mean of 8.22%.           
 
Dicsussion:  
 The first objective of this study is to examine the presence of institutional investors the shareholdings of 
Malaysian listed firms. The results reveal that 69.4% of the listed firms under study have institutional 
shareholdings in their ownership structure, thus signaling institutional investors’ ability to penetrate the 
portfolios’ ownership structure due to the immense amount of assets possessed by them. 
 The second objective is to identify the level of shareholdings by different types of institutional investors, 
whether in total, by their nature, investment horizons, or their ownership status. The results reveal that in total, 
only 13% of the shareholdings in Bursa Malaysia listed firms belong to institutional investors. Compared to 
developed countries with more than 30% of shareholdings, the level is low. However, a previous study justify 
that among the 10 largest firms listed on Bursa Malaysia, the institutional investors hold 50% of shareholdings 
(Saleh et al., 2010). These situations thus clarify that institutional investors tend to invest in firms with large 
size. 
 The results in previous section also highlight that the unit trust and mutual funds, followed by the pension 
funds and banks, hold the highest percentage of ownership. These findings provide new insights on the 
institutional shareholdings, as the results of a previous study (Ghosh, 2006) reveal that the largest share 
ownership was that of pension funds.  Thus, the findings justify that the unit trust and mutual funds are seen as 
gaining its significance in profiling their existence in the shareholding structure among the listed firms. The 
significance of the unit trust and mutual funds can also be justified by the fact that government-managed unit 
trust fund, or PNB, holds the highest level of shareholding, as with the pilgrim’s fund and LTH. 
 In relation to their nature, dedicated institutions are seen to hold higher percentage of shareholdings. This is 
a good sign as previous studies show that the presence of dedicated institutions may mitigate earnings 
management (Abdul Jalil & Abdul Rahman, 2010; Chung et al., 2002; Hsu & Koh, 2005; Koh, 2003) and 
inculcate social responsibilities (Abd-Mutalib et al., 2013; Johnson & Greening, 1999; Oh & Chang, 2011). 
Finally, government-managed institutions are seen to be dominating the market for institutional investors among 
Bursa Malaysia listed firms, thus confirms the findings in previous studies (Abdul Wahab et al., 2008). 
 
Conclusions And Avenues For Future Research: 
 The purpose of this study is to explore share ownership of institutional investors among Bursa Malaysia 
listed firms. The results have revealed that unit trusts and mutual funds as a whole have the highest percentage 
of shareholdings. By separate institutions, the PNB and LTH dominate the share ownership, followed by the 
EPF. Furthermore, dedicated institutions display higher level of ownership compared to transient institutions. 
Finally, government-related institutional investors are seen to possess higher control in the share ownership of 
Bursa Malaysia listed firms. 
 The study is not without limitations. Firstly, it focuses only on descriptive statistics of the ownership by 
institutional investors in Bursa Malaysia listed firms. Secondly, the measurement for institutional ownership is 
limited to the percentage of ownership by institutional investors. Future research may consider examining the 
factors that might give impact to such ownership, thus providing insights into the dynamics of institutional 
investments and shareholdings, and may also consider gauging the value of the shareholdings.  
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